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FEDERAL COURTS’ SUPERVISORY AUTHORITY IN
FEDERAL CRIMINAL CASES:
THE WARREN COURT REVOLUTION THAT MIGHT
HAVE BEEN
Bruce A. Green*
I. INTRODUCTION
The Warren Court is said to have launched a criminal procedure
“revolution” with its decision in Mapp v. Ohio,1 extending the Fourth
Amendment’s exclusionary rule to state court proceedings.2 Thereafter,
the Warren Court continued to interpret the Bill of Rights provisions
expansively to protect individual rights and promote fair process in both
state and federal criminal cases. Considerable writing has been devoted
to the Warren Court’s constitutional criminal procedure decisions both
individually and collectively. Scholars debate both the motivation
behind these decisions3 and the significance of their impact, given how
inhospitable many of the later Court’s decisions have been toward
criminal defendants’ rights and Warren Court precedent.4
This Article examines the significance of a non-constitutional
criminal procedure decision from the Warren Court’s pre-revolutionary

* © 2020, Stein Chair and Director of the Stein Center for Law and Ethics at Fordham Law
School. For many helpful comments on an earlier draft, my thanks to participants in the August
2018 SEALS discussion group and the April 2019 Stetson Law Review symposium on “Conversations
on the Warren Court’s Impact on Criminal Justice—After 50 Years.”
1. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
2. See Yale Kamisar, The Warren Court and Criminal Justice: A Quarter-Century Retrospective,
31 TULSA L. REV. 1, 1–2 & n.3 (1995); Stephen J. Schulhofer, The Constitution and the Police: Individual
Rights and Law Enforcement, 66 WASH. U. L.Q. 11, 12 (1988).
3. See, e.g., Corinna Barrett Lain, Countermajoritarian Hero or Zero? Rethinking the Warren
Court’s Role in the Criminal Procedure Revolution, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 1361, 1364 (2004) (challenging
“whether the Warren Court’s criminal procedure decisions were truly the bastion of
countermajoritarian decision making they have been made out to be”); Eric J. Miller, The Warren
Court’s Regulatory Revolution in Criminal Procedure, 43 CONN. L. REV. 1, 3 (2010) (challenging the
“standard story” that the Court was “motivated by an emphasis on political, social, and economic
equality for racial minorities” until it became “[f]rightened . . . by the popular backlash against high
crime rates”).
4. See, e.g., Carol S. Steiker, Counter-Revolution in Constitutional Criminal Procedure? Two
Audiences, Two Answers, 94 MICH. L. REV. 2466 (1996) (discussing debate).
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period. It looks back at Offutt v. United States,5 a relatively obscure case
decided by the Warren Court in 1954, seven years before Mapp.
Offutt reviewed a criminal defense lawyer’s criminal conviction.
The federal district judge presiding over a criminal trial was offended by
Offutt’s defense tactics and, at the close of the trial, punished Offutt
summarily for contempt of court. 6 In overturning Offutt’s conviction
because of the district judge’s lack of impartiality, the Court invoked
“th[e] Court’s ‘supervisory authority over the administration of criminal
justice in the federal courts,’”7 not constitutional due process, on which
the Court relied two decades later when it set aside a contempt
conviction imposed by a state trial judge in similar circumstances.8 In
subsequent decisions into the early 1960s, the Court continued to
express its conception of fair process by invoking its supervisory
authority in federal criminal cases. However, beginning with Mapp, the
Court set its sights on state criminal process, issuing the expansive
constitutional rulings for which the Warren Court is better remembered.
This Article traces the Supreme Court’s expansion and contraction
of supervisory authority in federal criminal cases. It briefly describes the
Court’s “supervisory authority” decisions leading up to Offutt in Part II,
and discusses Offutt in Part III. Then the Article turns to Offutt’s
aftermath. Part IV describes the initial significance of supervisory
authority following Offutt, while Part V discusses the declining role of
supervisory authority once the Warren Court turned its attention to the
Bill of Rights provisions, and Part VI describes the erosion of supervisory
authority by later Courts. The Article concludes in Part VII by asking
whether supervisory authority might have sustained a more important
role in federal criminal procedure if it had been more firmly entrenched
during the Warren Court era.
II. SUPERVISORY AUTHORITY PRIOR TO OFFUTT
The Supreme Court’s 1943 decision in McNabb v. United States 9 is
said to mark the Court’s earliest invocation of “supervisory authority”
over the administration of criminal justice.10 In McNabb, the Court held
5. 348 U.S. 11 (1954).
6. Id. at 12.
7. Id. at 13 (quoting McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332, 341 (1943)).
8. Taylor v. Hayes, 418 U.S. 488, 500 (1974).
9. 318 U.S. 332 (1943).
10. See, e.g., Amy Coney Barrett, The Supervisory Power of the Supreme Court, 106 COLUM. L. REV.
324, 328–29 (2006); Sara Sun Beale, Reconsidering Supervisory Power in Criminal Cases:
Constitutional and Statutory Limits on the Authority of the Federal Courts, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1433,
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that federal defendants’ confessions had been improperly admitted
against them because the defendants had been held in custody at length
for questioning rather than being brought to court promptly as required
by federal statutes.11 The defendants cited earlier decisions holding
coerced confessions to be inadmissible as a matter of due process. But
Justice Frankfurter’s opinion explained that the Court did not have to
decide the constitutionality of the interrogations, because it could
independently set standards of fair criminal process in federal cases:
[W]hile the power of this Court to undo convictions in state courts is
limited to the enforcement of those “fundamental principles of
liberty and justice,” which are secured by the Fourteenth
Amendment, the scope of our reviewing power over convictions
brought here from the federal courts is not confined to ascertainment
of Constitutional validity. Judicial supervision of the administration
of criminal justice in the federal courts implies the duty of
establishing and maintaining civilized standards of procedure and
evidence. Such standards are not satisfied merely by observance of
those minimal historic safeguards for securing trial by reason which
are summarized as “due process of law” and below which we reach
what is really trial by force. Moreover, review by this Court of state
action expressing its notion of what will best further its own security
in the administration of criminal justice demands appropriate
respect for the deliberative judgment of a state in so basic an exercise
of its jurisdiction. Considerations of large policy in making the
necessary accommodations in our federal system are wholly
irrelevant to the formulation and application of proper standards for
the enforcement of the federal criminal law in the federal courts.
The principles governing the admissibility of evidence in federal
criminal trials have not been restricted, therefore, to those derived
solely from the Constitution. In the exercise of its supervisory
authority over the administration of criminal justice in the federal
courts, this Court has, from the very beginning of its history,
formulated rules of evidence to be applied in federal criminal
1435 (1984); Dep’t of Justice, Office of Legal Policy, Report to the Attorney General on the Judiciary’s
Use of Supervisory Power to Control Federal Law Enforcement Activity, 22 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 773,
775 (1989); Alfred Hill, The Bill of Rights and the Supervisory Power, 69 COLUM. L. REV. 181, 193
(1969). Federal courts’ supervisory authority over the criminal justice process can be distinguished
from other sources of federal judicial regulatory authority, such as their “inherent authority . . . to
protect their own jurisdiction” and their authority to regulate lawyers. Fred C. Zacharias & Bruce A.
Green, Federal Court Authority to Regulate Lawyers: A Practice in Search of a Theory?, 56 VAND. L.
REV. 1303, 1311 (2003).
11. McNabb, 318 U.S. at 344–47. In a companion case, Anderson v. United States, the Court
suppressed confessions based on the same considerations governing the McNabb decision. 318 U.S.
350, 355 (1943).
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prosecutions. And in formulating such rules of evidence for federal
criminal trials the Court has been guided by considerations of justice
not limited to the strict canons of evidentiary relevance.12

As precedent for this exercise of judicial authority, the Court cited
decisions going back to the early 1800s in which the Court ruled on the
admissibility of evidence in federal criminal cases.13
Over the ensuing decade, the Vinson Court adhered to the McNabb
decision, which it rationalized as “an exercise of [the Court’s] duty to
formulate policy appropriate for criminal trials in the federal courts.”14
In a 1948 decision, the Vinson Court divided over its understanding of
McNabb’s implications for the admissibility of confessions,15 with the
majority holding a confession inadmissible because of a statutorily
excessive delay in bringing the arrested defendant before a judicial
officer.16 But even the dissent acknowledged that “[w]hen not
inconsistent with a statute, or the Constitution, there is no doubt of the
power of this Court to institute, on its own initiative, reforms in the
federal practice as to the admissibility of evidence in criminal trials in
federal courts.”17
The Vinson Court made stingy use of its supervisory authority,
however. The only other examples were a pair of 1946 decisions
condemning wholesale exclusions of groups from juries: Thiel v.
Southern Pacific Co.,18 overturning a civil judgment where wage earners
had been systematically excluded from the jury panel,19 followed by

12. McNabb, 318 U.S. at 340–41 (citations omitted).
13. Id. at 341 (citations omitted). Professor Pushaw has observed that two of the eight
decisions cited by the Court “stand for the opposite principle” and that “[t]he other six were
inapposite,” and “[t]he Court effectively adopted the rationale for general supervisory power that
Justice Brandeis had advocated in a series of dissents in the 1920s: that the judiciary had
independent authority to develop adjective law to preserve its integrity, quite apart from its duty
to enforce the Constitution and federal statutes.” Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., The Inherent Powers of
Federal Courts and the Structural Constitution, 86 IOWA L. REV. 735, 780–81 (2001). For other
discussions of McNabb and its historical background, see Barrett, supra note 10, at 373–76; Beale,
supra note 10, at 1435–48.
14. United States v. Mitchell, 322 U.S. 65, 68 (1944). In Mitchell, the Court found McNabb
inapplicable because the defendant made his admissions before being held for an inordinate length
of time. The Court also declined to extend McNabb in United States v. Bayer, where the trial court
excluded a custodial confession obtained in violation of McNabb but admitted one voluntarily given
by the defendant six months later. 331 U.S. 532, 540–41 (1947).
15. Upshaw v. United States, 335 U.S. 410 (1948).
16. Id. at 412–14. The Court applied the McNabb rule again in United States v. Carignan, another
case involving a confession obtained after inordinate delay in bringing the defendant to court. 342
U.S. 36, 41 (1951).
17. Upshaw, 335 U.S. at 414–15.
18. 328 U.S. 217 (1946).
19. Id. at 223–24.
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Ballard v. United States,20 overturning a criminal conviction where
women had been systemically excluded from the grand and petit
juries.21 Notably, this pair of decisions went beyond questions of
evidentiary admissibility in regulating federal practice.
More often, the Vinson Court declined to employ its supervisory
authority, although it accepted the legitimacy of this power. In Fisher v.
United States,22 decided in 1946, the Court upheld a capital murder
conviction where the District of Columbia trial judge refused to instruct
the jury that it could take account of the defendant’s diminished mental
capacity.23 Apparently regarding the District of Columbia as the
equivalent of a state, the majority found supervisory authority
inapplicable, observing, “[t]he administration of criminal law in matters
not affected by Constitutional limitations or a general federal law is a
matter peculiarly of local concern.” 24 In Pinkerton v. United States,25
decided soon after, the Court essentially ignored the dissent’s argument
that, as a matter of supervisory authority, the Court should not allow a
federal defendant to be sentenced both for conspiracy and for
substantive offenses for which he was convicted only by virtue of his
participation in the underlying conspiracy. 26
In its 1952 decision in On Lee v. United States,27 the Court similarly
declined the dissent’s invitation to invoke supervisory authority. There,
the Court held that an undercover investigator’s secret recording of his
conversations with the defendant was admissible. After concluding that
the recording did not violate the Fourth Amendment or the relevant
federal statute, the Court refused to exclude the recording based on its
supervisory authority.28 Four dissenting Justices regarded the
investigator’s conduct as so distasteful—“‘dirty business,’” Justice
Frankfurter called it29—that the prosecution should be barred from
exploiting it, but the majority concluded that the Court’s “disapproval
must not be thought to justify a social policy of the magnitude necessary
to arbitrarily exclude otherwise relevant evidence.”30
20. 329 U.S. 187 (1946).
21. Id. at 195–96.
22. 328 U.S. 463 (1946).
23. Id. at 464, 470.
24. Id. at 476. See also Eagles v. United States, 329 U.S. 304, 315 (1946) (stating that supervisory
authority did not apply in the habeas context).
25. 328 U.S. 640 (1946).
26. See id. at 650–54 (Rutledge, J., dissenting in part).
27. 343 U.S. 747 (1952).
28. Id. at 754–58.
29. Id. at 760 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
30. Id. at 757.
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III. THE EARLY WARREN COURT’S OFFUTT DECISION
Earl Warren became Chief Justice in 1953. 31 The following year,
starting with United States v. Offutt,32 the Warren Court began to employ
supervisory authority more robustly to rectify perceived procedural
injustices in federal criminal cases, often in a manner that expanded
procedural protections for federal criminal defendants generally. 33
Offutt defended a doctor accused of performing an abortion in the
District of Columbia.34 Throughout the fourteen day trial, Offutt clashed
with the federal district judge, and “with increasing personal overtones,”
the judge admonished Offutt and threatened to hold him in contempt for
disobeying the court’s rulings and for overly aggressive advocacy.35 In
Justice Frankfurter’s description, “these interchanges between court and
counsel were marked by expressions and revealed an attitude which
hardly reflected the restraints of conventional judicial demeanor.”36
After the jury began deliberating, the judge initiated summary criminal
contempt proceedings.37
Without specifying the charges against Offutt or providing an
evidentiary hearing, the judge made twelve findings of contempt and
sentenced Offutt to ten days’ imprisonment.38 On appeal, the court of
appeals sustained four of the twelve findings and reduced Offutt’s
sentence to two days’ imprisonment, while reversing the doctor’s
criminal conviction in a separate opinion because the judge’s
antagonistic behavior made the doctor’s trial unfair.39
Justice Frankfurter’s majority opinion signaled that the Court was
revitalizing its supervisory authority. Quoting McNabb, he explained
that the Court had decided to review Offutt’s conviction “[i]n view of this
Court’s ‘supervisory authority over the administration of criminal
justice in the federal courts,’ and the importance of assuring alert selfrestraint in the exercise by district judges of the summary power for
punishing contempt.”40 This explanation is somewhat suspect, given that
31. Archibald Cox, Chief Justice Earl Warren, 83 HARV. L. REV. 1, 2 (1969).
32. 348 U.S. 11 (1954).
33. See generally Beale, supra note 10, at 1448–55 (describing how supervisory power has
expanded the general rules of procedure and evidence, creating more fairness and reliable criminal
proceedings).
34. Offutt, 348 U.S. at 12.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 12–13.
40. Id. at 13 (citing McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332, 341 (1943)). Justice Frankfurter was
well aware that in reviewing a federal criminal contempt conviction, the Court had no need to rely
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neither Offutt’s petition for certiorari nor the Government’s opposition
cited McNabb—nor, for that matter, did the parties’ briefs on the
merits.41 Moreover, the Court had ample authority to review the process
leading to Offutt’s conviction without reference to either constitutional
limits or supervisory authority. As it did in prior federal criminal
contempt cases both predating and postdating McNabb, the Court could
simply have analyzed whether the trial court exceeded its inherent
authority, or its authority under Rule 42 of the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure, to punish criminal contempt summarily.42
The Court did not question whether Offutt’s conduct was
sanctionable but focused on the fairness of the process by which he was
punished.43 “The vital point,” Justice Frankfurter observed, “is that in
sitting in judgment on such a misbehaving lawyer the judge should not
himself give vent to personal spleen or respond to a personal grievance.
These are subtle matters, for they concern the ingredients of what
constitutes justice. Therefore, justice must satisfy the appearance of
justice.”44 The opinion concluded that the contempt proceedings should
have been conducted by a different judge, because “instead of
representing the impersonal authority of law, the trial judge permitted
himself to become personally embroiled with the petitioner,” and
therefore he could not be counted on to preside impartially. 45
IV. THE RISE OF SUPERVISORY AUTHORITY IN THE EARLY WARREN
COURT
From a constitutional perspective, the Court’s Offutt opinion was an
exercise of restraint.46 Offutt argued that he had been denied the Fifth
Amendment due process right to an impartial judge, to notice, and to a
on the supervisory authority that he had previously discussed in McNabb. His scholarship, while
teaching at Harvard Law School, included an article deeply exploring the history bearing on federal
courts’ authority, under federal law, to punish criminal contempt, and exposing the Court’s
mischaracterization of the federal law in Toledo Newspaper Co. v. United States, 247 U.S. 402 (1918).
See Felix Frankfurter & James M. Landis, Power of Congress over Procedure in Criminal Contempts in
“Inferior” Federal Courts—A Study in Separation of Powers, 37 HARV. L. REV. 1010, 1029–38 (1924).
In Nye v. United States, the Court accepted the article’s account and corrected its earlier error. 313
U.S. 33, 47–48 (1941).
41. See generally Brief for the United States, Offutt v. United States, 348 U.S. 11 (1954) (No. 27);
Reply Brief for Petitioner, Offutt v. United States, 348 U.S. 11 (1954) (No. 27) [hereinafter Pet’r’s
Reply Br.] (neither referring to McNabb at all).
42. See, e.g., Sacher v. United States, 343 U.S. 1 (1952); In re Michael, 326 U.S. 224 (1945).
43. Offutt, 348 U.S. at 17.
44. Id. at 14.
45. Id. at 17.
46. See Henry J. Friendly, The Bill of Rights as a Code of Criminal Procedure, 53 CALIF. L. REV. 929
(1965).
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hearing.47 Had the Court agreed, its decision would have applied directly
to state criminal cases, since the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process
Clause, applicable to the states, presumably required the same elements
of fair process as Fifth Amendment due process.48 Instead, although state
courts might find the opinion to be persuasive, the Court’s ruling applied
only in federal cases.
At the same time, Offutt’s references to McNabb and to the Court’s
“supervisory authority” gave the decision a potential significance
beyond the criminal contempt context governed by Rule 42. As Justice
Frankfurter explained in McNabb, in supervising federal proceedings,
the Court was not limited by the Constitution’s “minimal historic
safeguards for securing trial by reason.”49 Offutt might have been read as
the rebirth of supervisory authority, encouraging the Supreme Court in
future federal criminal cases to express “what constitutes justice” and
inviting federal courts of appeals to do the same, using “the appearance
of justice”—that is, the Justices’ own sense of procedural fairness and
wise criminal justice policy—as the lodestar.
Before it decided Mapp v. Ohio50 in 1961, the Court reviewed over a
dozen other cases implicating its supervisory authority. The Warren
Court used this power more generously than the Vinson Court. For
example, in Roviaro v. United States,51 the Court rejected the
government’s asserted right to withhold its informer’s identity, holding
that the defendant was entitled on cross-examination to elicit the
identity of an informer who was the only other participant in the alleged
narcotics transaction.52 In Grunewald v. United States,53 while
overturning all three defendants’ tax fraud conspiracy convictions on
other grounds, 54 the Court also invoked supervisory authority to hold it
improper for the prosecution to cross-examine one of the defendants
based on his invocation of the Fifth Amendment right against selfincrimination.55

47. See Pet’r’s Reply Br., supra note 41, at 2.
48. James W. Ely, Jr., Due Process Clause, THE HERITAGE GUIDE TO THE CONST.,
https://www.heritage.org/constitution/amendments/14/essays/170/due-process-clause (last
visited Nov. 9, 2019) (“Modern lawn interprets the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to impose
the same substantive due process and procedural due process requirements on the federal and
state governments.”).
49. McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332, 340 (1943).
50. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
51. 353 U.S. 53 (1957).
52. Id. at 65.
53. 353 U.S. 391 (1957).
54. Id. at 424.
55. Id. at 423–24. The Court explained its decision to address the question as follows:
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The Court later described Roviaro as an exercise of its traditional
“power to formulate evidentiary rules for federal criminal cases,”56 and
the same might be said of Grunewald. But other decisions expressed the
Court’s willingness to establish other kinds of procedural safeguards in
federal criminal cases. In a tax prosecution, the Court invoked
supervisory power in ruling, in passing, that prosecutors must
investigate defendants’ innocent explanations for unexplained increases
in net worth that were alleged to be taxable income.57 In another case,
the Court used its supervisory power to set aside a drug distribution
conviction where the jury had read news accounts referring to the
defendant’s prior convictions which had been ruled inadmissible.58 And
in a particularly expansive exercise of supervisory authority, the Court
barred a federal investigator from testifying in a state criminal
proceeding about evidence that had been illegally obtained and
suppressed in a federal criminal proceeding.59 This was before the Court
held in Mapp that the Fourth Amendment applied to the states. Although
the Court’s supervisory authority did not extend to state court
proceedings, the Court thought it had authority to police the conduct of
federal criminal agents.
A high water mark for the Court’s supervisory power was Elkins v.
United States,60 decided just one year before Mapp. Setting aside decades
of decisions applying the so-called “silver platter” doctrine, the Court
held that evidence obtained by state authorities is inadmissible in
federal criminal proceedings if obtained in contravention of the
restrictions that the Fourth Amendment imposes on federal
investigators.61 The Court relied heavily on Justice Frankfurter’s

We are not unmindful that the question whether a prior statement is sufficiently
inconsistent to be allowed to go to the jury on the question of credibility is usually within
the discretion of the trial judge. But where such evidentiary matter has grave constitutional
overtones, as it does here, we feel justified in exercising this Court’s supervisory control to
pass on such a question.
Id. Grunewald anticipated the Court’s decision in Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965), which
held that commenting on the defendant’s silence violates the Fifth Amendment right against self incrimination. Id. at 615.
56. McCray v. Illinois, 386 U.S. 300, 312 (1967) (discussing Roviaro).
57. Holland v. United States, 348 U.S. 121, 135–36 & n.7 (1954).
58. Marshall v. United States, 360 U.S. 310, 313 (1959).
59. Rea v. United States, 350 U.S. 214, 217 (1956). The Court distinguished Rea in Wilson v.
Schnettler, and then again in Clear v. Bolger, finding in both cases that federal courts could not
exercise supervisory authority to enjoin federal agents from testifying in state cases about their
acquisition of evidence. 365 U.S. 381, 386 (1961); 371 U.S. 392, 398–99 (1963).
60. 364 U.S. 206 (1960).
61. Id. at 223–24.
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majority opinion in Wolf v. Colorado,62 holding that the core of the Fourth
Amendment’s freedom from arbitrary police intrusions on privacy
applies to the states by virtue of the Due Process Clause,63 even though
the exclusionary rule does not.64 The Court thought that Wolf undercut
the rationale of the earlier “silver platter” opinions,65 although Justice
Frankfurter, who had authored the Court’s opinion in Wolf, disagreed
and dissented in Elkins.66 The majority’s ruling in Elkins, excluding the
evidence illegally obtained by the state, did not rest on the Fourth
Amendment exclusionary rule—it relied on the Court’s supervisory
power, as recognized in McNabb.67
This is not to say that the Court employed its supervisory authority
at every opportunity.68 It declined to use supervisory authority to allow
a court to dismiss an indictment not supported by competent evidence.69
In another case, it declined the suggestion in a concurring opinion that it
expand the entrapment defense as an exercise of supervisory
authority.70 In another, it overturned a conviction on other grounds and
therefore did not consider the dissent’s argument that it should do so as
62. 338 U.S. 25 (1949).
63. Id. at 27–28.
64. Id. at 33.
65. Elkins, 364 U.S. at 213–14.
66. Id. at 237–41 (Frankfurter, J., with Clark, Harlan, and Whittaker, JJ., dissenting).
67. Id. at 216 (majority opinion) (“What is here invoked is the Court’s supervisory power over
the administration of criminal justice in the federal courts, under which the Court has ‘from the very
beginning of its history, formulated rules of evidence to be applied in federal criminal
prosecution.’”) (quoting McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332, 341 (1943)). Another search-andseizure case evidently relying on supervisory authority was Giordenello v. United States, 357 U.S.
480 (1958). There, the Court found that an arrest was invalid where the application did not set forth
probable cause as required by the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. Id. at 485–87. The Court
held that evidence seized pursuant to the arrest was inadmissible. Id. at 488. Although the decision
did not refer to supervisory authority or McNabb, the opinion might be read, like McNabb, to require
evidentiary suppression as a remedy for a violation of a procedural rule that does not explicitly
provide for such a remedy. Giordenello was later identified as a supervisory powers decision. See
Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 118 (1964) (Clark, J., with Black, and Stewart, JJ., dissenting).
68. It is unclear whether the Court exercised its supervisory authority in Green v. United States
to establish a rule for federal court judges. 365 U.S. 301 (1961) (plurality). The question was
whether the district judge had provided the defendant an opportunity to speak on his own behalf
regarding the sentence to be imposed, as required by a Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure. Id. at
303–04. To avoid future ambiguities, Justice Frankfurter wrote in a plurality opinion: “Trial judges
before sentencing should, as a matter of good judicial administration, unambiguously address
themselves to the defendant. Hereafter trial judges should leave no room for doubt that the
defendant has been issued a personal invitation to speak prior to sentencing.” Id. at 305. Justice
Stewart added in a concurrence: “I do think the better practice in sentencing is to assure the
defendant an express opportunity to speak for himself, in addition to anything that his lawyer may
have to say. I would apply such a rule prospectively, in the exercise of our supervisory capacity.” Id.
at 306 (Stewart, J., concurring). In context, it appears that Justice Frankfurter’s pronouncement
regarding what district judges “should” do rather than “must” do was slightly more precatory than
an exercise of supervisory power.
69. Costello v. United States, 350 U.S. 359, 363–64 (1956).
70. Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369, 376 (1958).
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an exercise of supervisory authority. 71 And in a criminal contempt case,
the Court ignored the dissent’s argument for overturning the conviction
as an exercise of supervisory authority. 72
However, none of the decisions suggested that the Court had any
skepticism or discomfort regarding federal courts’ supervisory power.
On the contrary, the Court extolled its supervisory authority in two
decisions overturning judgments predicated on the testimony of
government informants who were later revealed to have testified falsely
elsewhere on similar subjects.73 In the first, citing McNabb, Justice
Frankfurter wrote:
The untainted administration of justice is certainly one of the most
cherished aspects of our institutions. Its observance is one of our
proudest boasts. This Court is charged with supervisory functions in
relation to proceedings in the federal courts. Therefore, fastidious
regard for the honor of the administration of justice requires the
Court to make certain that the doing of justice be made so manifest
that only irrational or perverse claims of its disregard can be
asserted.74

The Court quoted this encomium in the second case, setting aside a
criminal conviction on essentially the same ground.75
The Court continued to apply supervisory authority, as in McNabb,
when a confession was obtained in violation of federal law requiring
agents to bring an arrested defendant to court promptly.76 But the Court
plainly did not think its power was limited to remedying violations of
federal statutes, was confined to deciding questions of evidence in
federal court, or was otherwise restrained when it came to questions of
federal criminal process in or out of court. The Court assumed that it
71. Smith v. United States, 360 U.S. 1, 10 (1959); see id. at 17–18 (Clark, J., with Harlan, and
Stewart, JJ., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
72. Brown v. United States, 359 U.S. 41, 42 (1959); see id. at 61–62 (Warren, C.J., with Black,
Douglas, and Brennan, JJ., dissenting).
73. Communist Party of the United States v. Subversive Activities Control Bd., 351 U.S. 115, 125
(1956) (overturning an administrative board’s determination that the Communist Party of the
United States had to register as a communist organization); Mesaroch v. United States, 352 U.S. 1,
14 (1956) (overturning a conviction for conspiring to advocate the overthrow of the government,
because the government acknowledged that an informant who testified at the trial about his
infiltration of the Communist Party had testified falsely in several other contemporaneous
proceedings regarding the same subject). See also United States v. Shotwell, 355 U.S. 233, 242
(1957) (vacating the court of appeals decision and remanding criminal case to the district court
where, post-appeal, the Government submitted affidavits indicating that the defendants were
relying on false testimony).
74. Communist Party, 351 U.S. at 124 (citations omitted).
75. Mesaroch, 352 U.S. at 14 (quoting Communist Party, 351 U.S. at 124).
76. Mallory v. United States, 354 U.S. 449, 451–53, 455 (1957).
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could independently assess the propriety of federal investigative
conduct to ensure, in the language of Offutt, that justice “satisf[ies] the
appearance of justice.”77 In a state case upholding the constitutionality
of a custodial interrogation although the defendant and his lawyer were
denied access to each other, the Court observed that, in a federal case, it
would surely have used its supervisory power to suppress the
defendant’s confession based on its supervisory authority:
We share the strong distaste expressed by the two lower courts over
the episode disclosed by this record. Were this a federal prosecution
we would have little difficulty in dealing with what occurred under
our general supervisory power over the administration of justice in
the federal courts. But to hold that what happened here violated the
Constitution of the United States is quite another matter. 78

If, as scholars later observed, the early Warren Court was vague
about the source and parameters of its supervisory authority, 79 it was
nonetheless confident in its possession of this power, in the breadth of
this power, and in the obligation to employ it.
V. THE WANING OF SUPERVISORY AUTHORITY IN THE LATER WARREN
COURT
It is generally agreed that the Warren Court’s criminal procedure
“revolution” began with its 1961 decision in Mapp, holding states subject
to the Fourth Amendment’s exclusionary rule.80 The Court took its
77. Offutt v. United States, 348 U.S. 11, 14 (1954).
78. Cicenia v. La Gay, 357 U.S. 504, 508–09 (1958) (citations omitted). See also Crooker v.
California, 357 U.S. 433, 439 n.4 (1958).
At times petitioner appears to urge “a rule” barring use of a voluntary confession obtained
after state denial of a request to contact counsel regardless of whether any violation of a
due process right to counsel occurred. That contention is simply an appeal to the
supervisory power of this Court over the administration of justice in the federal courts. The
short answer to such a contention here is that this conviction was had in a state, not a
federal, court.
Id. (citations omitted).
79. See, e.g., Barrett, supra note 10, at 329, 333. Scholars have considered or challenged various
rationales for the Court’s exercise of this authority. See, e.g., id. at 387 (concluding that “the
Constitution’s structure cuts against, and history rules out, the proposition that the Supreme Court
possesses inherent supervisory power over inferior court procedure”); Beale, supra note 10, at
1520–21 (concluding that “[t]he supervisory power label has been used to describe the exercise of
several different forms of judicial power” and that none of them justifies “decisions that cannot be
characterized as procedural or remedial in nature. . . . The exclusion of evidence or the dismissal of
a prosecution because of constitutionally and statutorily permissible conduct by government
investigators and prosecutors violates the separation of powers . . . .”).
80. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 660 (1961).
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earliest opportunity thereafter, in Ker v. California,81 to offer reassurance
that the expectations of reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment
“are not susceptible of Procrustean application”82 and that “Mapp
sounded no death knell for our federalism.”83 The opinion acknowledged
that the Court had previously invoked its supervisory authority to
establish rules for federal cases on the admissibility of evidence
obtained by investigative agents, but promised that Mapp “established
no assumption by this Court of supervisory authority over state courts,
and, consequently, it implied no total obliteration of state laws relating
to arrests and searches in favor of federal law.”84
Notwithstanding this nod to states’ interest in regulating their own
criminal procedure, the Warren Court expanded its docket of state
criminal cases, applying the Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Amendments to the
states in essentially the same way as to the federal government and
interpreting these provisions more expansively than in the past. Gideon
v. Wainwright,85 establishing indigent defendants’ right to appointed
counsel in felony cases,86 became the foundation of a host of other
subsequent right-to-counsel decisions.87 Miranda v. Arizona,88 famously
requiring police to warn arrested defendants of their rights before
questioning them,89 entered the national vocabulary. These and other
decisions fundamentally altered national criminal practices.
Even when reviewing federal criminal cases, the Court did not
hesitate to decide on constitutional grounds, giving its opinions a
precedential impact in state cases as well. For example, in Katz v. United

81. 374 U.S. 23 (1963).
82. Id. at 33.
83. Id. at 31.
84. Id. (citations omitted).
85. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
86. Id. at 338–39.
87. See Bruce A. Green, Gideon’s Amici: Why Do Prosecutors So Rarely Defend the Rights of the
Accused?, 122 YALE L.J. 2336, 2338–39 (2013).
Gideon leads to a right to assigned counsel for misdemeanor defendants facing
imprisonment, and eventually to lawsuits challenging the adequacy of state funding for
indigent criminal defense. The decision becomes the foundation for the right to competent
and conflict-free counsel; protection from state and judicial interference with the lawyerclient relationship and with one’s choice of counsel; and limits on police interrogations after
formal charges are initiated. At least indirectly, Gideon opens the door to other procedural
protections, both within and outside the criminal context, including a right to appointed
counsel in some civil cases.
Id.

88. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
89. Id. at 471–72.
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States,90 rather than relying on supervisory authority, the Court held
warrantless electronic eavesdropping to be unconstitutional under the
Fourth Amendment.91 Likewise, in Massiah v. United States,92 the Court
relied on the Sixth Amendment in holding that investigators and their
informants could not secretly question indicted defendants.93 And in
United States v. Wade,94 the Court extended the Sixth Amendment right
to counsel to post-indictment line-ups,95 over a dissent that suggested
that the ruling was questionable even as an exercise of supervisory
authority.96
The Court was mindful that it could not be as protective of fair
process and individual interests when engaging in constitutional
interpretation as when invoking its supervisory authority. For example,
on the same day it decided Mapp, the Court held that, although it
continued to adhere to McNabb, it was not extending McNabb to state
courts as a matter of constitutional due process.97 Conversely, the
Justices recognized that supervisory authority gave them more leeway
to right wrongs.98
But even so, the Court did not gravitate toward supervisory
authority in federal cases as an exercise of constitutional restraint. When
there were five votes for an expansive constitutional decision in a
federal criminal case, the Court reached the constitutional question. For
example, the Court held in Murphy v. Waterfront Commission of New York
Harbor99 that the right against self-incrimination precluded the state
from compelling a witness to incriminate himself under federal law and

90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.

389 U.S. 347 (1967).
Id. at 353.
377 U.S. 201 (1964).
Id. at 205–06.
388 U.S. 218 (1967).
Id. at 236–37.
Id. at 259 (White, J., with Harlan and Stewart, JJ., dissenting in part and concurring in part).
Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568, 600–01 (1961).

The McNabb case was an innovation which derived from our concern and responsibility for
fair modes of criminal proceeding in the federal courts. The States, in the large, have not
adopted a similar exclusionary principle. And although we adhere unreservedly to McNabb
for federal criminal cases, we have not extended its rule to state prosecutions as a
requirement of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Id.

98. For example, in Rideau v. Louisiana, Justice Clark disagreed with the Court’s conclusion that
the defendant had been denied due process by being tried in a venue where his prison interrogation,
in which he made incriminating admissions, had been televised. 373 U.S. 723, 729 (1963) (Clark, J.,
with Harlan, J., dissenting). But he noted that in a federal case raising the same facts, he would have
overturned the defendant’s conviction as an exercise of supervisory authority. Id. at 728–29.
99. 378 U.S. 52 (1964).
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that, having done so, the witness’ testimony could not be used against
him in federal court.100 In his concurrence, Justice Harlan read the Fifth
Amendment right more narrowly but would have excluded the witness’
statements in federal proceedings as an exercise of supervisory
authority.101 The Court turned down the opportunity to capture an
additional Justice’s vote by taking the more restrained approach.
With Justice Frankfurter’s retirement from the Court in 1962, 102 the
Court lost its most ardent proponent of supervisory power, the author
of McNabb, Offutt, and other supervisory power opinions. The Court took
no more cases like Offutt where it would claim to have accepted review
precisely to consider a question of supervisory authority, and it evinced
little interest in making new rules of federal criminal procedure based
on supervisory power. Occasionally, dissenting Justices unpersuasively
urged the Court to rule for the defendant on supervisory authority
grounds.103 But if a procedure was not unjust enough to violate the Bill
of Rights, and was not proscribed by a federal rule or statute, the Court
was disinclined to establish or ratify further procedural restraints based
on federal courts’ supervisory authority.104 For example, in Simmons v.
United States,105 the Court held that a pretrial photo identification was
not unnecessarily suggestive and therefore inadmissible either under

100. Id. at 77–78.
101. Id. at 80–81 (Harlan, J., with Clark, J., concurring).
102. See John M. Harlan, The Frankfurter Imprint as Seen by a Colleague, 176 HARV. L. REV. 1, 1
(1962) (written “[o]n the occasion of [Justice Frankfurter’s] retirement from the Court”).
103. See, e.g., Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 320 (1966) (Warren, C.J., dissenting)
(maintaining the evidence should be suppressed as a matter of supervisory power); Berman v.
United States, 378 U.S. 530, 533–34 (1963) (Black, J., with Douglas, C.J., and Goldberg, J., dissenting)
(arguing that Court should have exercised its supervisory authority to reinstate the defendant’s
untimely appeal); Shotwell Mfg. Co. v. United States, 371 U.S. 341, 388–89 (1963) (Black, J., with
Warren, C.J., and Douglas, J., dissenting). In ruling for the federal criminal appellant on statutory
grounds in Hardy v. United States, the Court declined an opportunity to use its supervisory authority
to establish a more protective rule for future federal criminal appeals. 375 U.S. 277, 282 (1964). The
Court held that an indigent criminal defendant who has a new lawyer on appeal has a statutory right
to the full trial transcript, and not only those portions addressing the issues that the defendant,
before obtaining appellate counsel, expressed an intent to raise. Id. But the Court ignored Justice
Goldberg’s suggestion that “in the interests of justice this Court should require, under our
supervisory power, that full transcripts be provided, without limitation, in all federal criminal cases
to defendants who cannot afford to purchase them, whenever they seek to prosecute an appeal.” Id.
(Goldberg, J., with Brennan, C.J., and Stewart, J., concurring).
104. See, e.g., Osborn v. United States, 385 U.S. 323, 326–27 (1966) (rejecting the argument that
evidence should be excluded on constitutional grounds or under supervisory authority); Lopez v.
United States, 373 U.S. 427, 440 (1963) (rejecting the Fourth Amendment challenge to admission of
a consensual recorded conversation and declining to exclude evidence under supervisory authority,
explaining: “[T]he court’s inherent power to refuse to receive material evidence is a power that
must be sparingly exercised”); Cleary v. Bolger, 371 U.S. 392, 398, 400 (1963) (holding that the
federal court could not enjoin introduction of evidence in state court).
105. 390 U.S. 377 (1968).
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the Due Process Clause or pursuant to supervisory authority.106 The
Court did not put forward a different, and more protective, approach to
the admissibility of identification evidence in federal cases.
The Court did invoke supervisory authority in a case of little
significance to call for the correction of an obvious sentencing error,107
and in another to give effect to Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure.108 And, as in Offutt, the Court’s supervisory authority was the
apparent basis for two decisions overturning federal criminal contempt
convictions. In one, the Court held that a trial judge employing the
summary contempt power may not impose a prison sentence of more
than six months.109 In the other, the Court overturned a summary
contempt conviction against a lawyer who, to make a record for appeal,
repeatedly asked questions contrary to the judge’s instructions to stop
the questioning.110 But it seems fair to say that that the Court let its

106. Id. at 381–86. The Court held as a matter of due process “that convictions based on
eyewitness identification at trial following a pretrial identification by photograph will be set aside
on that ground only if the photographic identification procedure was so impermissibly suggestive
as to give rise to a very substantial likelihood of irreparable misidentification.” Id. at 384.
107. Bartone v. United States, 375 U.S. 52, 53–54 (1963). The Court held that the court of appeals
should have corrected the error immediately rather than requiring the defendant to file a separate
motion after the appeal was decided. It explained that “in federal proceedings, over which both the
[c]ourts of [a]ppeals and this Court have broad powers of supervision,” the court of appeals,
“whenever possible, [should] correct errors reachable by the appeal rather than remit the parties
to a new collateral proceeding.” Id. at 54 (citing McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332 (1943)).
108. In McCarthy v. United States, the Court set aside a guilty plea where the district judge failed
to question the defendant as required by Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure to
ensure that the defendant understood the charges. 394 U.S. 459, 463–64 (1969) (“This decision is
based solely upon our construction of Rule 11 and is made pursuant to our supervisory power over
the lower federal courts; we do not reach any of the constitutional arguments petitioner urges as
additional grounds for reversal.”). Justice Black filed a short concurrence suggesting that the
decision could have been reached based exclusively on Rule 11, without regard to supervisory
power. Id. at 477 (Black, J., concurring).
109. Cheff v. Schnackenberg, 384 U.S. 373, 380 (1966) (plurality) (“[I]n the exercise of the
Court’s supervisory power and under the peculiar power of the federal courts to revise sentences
in contempt cases, we rule further that sentences exceeding six months for criminal contempt may
not be imposed by federal courts absent a jury trial or waiver thereof.”). The parties in the case
argued the constitutionality of the process, and two justices were prepared to rule on constitutional
grounds. See id. at 375; id. at 384–93 (Douglas, J., with Black, J., dissenting).
110. In re McConnell, 370 U.S. 230, 235–36 (1962). The dissent acknowledged the Court’s
decision to be an exercise of supervisory authority. Id. at 237 (Harlan, J., with Stewart, J., dissenting).
In a third contempt case, the Court declined to invoke its supervisory authority. In Piemonte v.
United States, the trial judge summarily held a prison inmate in contempt for refusing, under a grant
of immunity, to answer questions about narcotics dealing, on the ground that he and his family
would be endangered if he complied. 367 U.S. 556, 558–59 (1961). In his dissenting opinion, Chief
Justice Warren maintained that “even if the Court is unwilling to recognize that the Constitution
prohibits the imposition of punishment in a summary proceeding, it ought to exercise its
supervisory power over the lower federal courts to rectify the abuse of the summary contempt
power which the record in this case makes manifest.” Id. at 564 (Warren, C.J., with Douglas, J.,
dissenting) (citing Offutt v. United States, 348 U.S. 11 (1954)).

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3557323

2020]

The Warren Court Revolution That Might Have Been

257

supervisory power atrophy.111 With respect to the exercise of
supervisory power, the later Warren Court was almost as stingy as the
Vinson Court had been after McNabb.
One certainly could not infer that the later Warren Court was hostile
to supervisory authority as the means of influencing the development of
criminal procedure. That was important because, as Sara Sun Beale
described in her seminal 1984 article on supervisory authority, lower
federal courts, on the example of the Court’s earlier decisions, made
robust use of supervisory power into and throughout the 1970s. 112
Nothing in the later Warren Court decisions would have discouraged
them from doing so. In its later years, the Warren Court was merely
indifferent, having discovered the shiny new power of constitutional
interpretation.
But one might have read into the later decisions an implication, no
doubt unintended, that supervisory authority had nothing more to say
on the subjects, such as searches and seizures and police interrogations,
that the constitutional decisions directly addressed. In other words,
supervisory power might now be understood as interstitial, potentially
superseded not only by legislation but by constitutional decisions of
limited reach.113 In effect, the constitutional case law risked crowding
out supervisory power, turning the Constitution into not only a floor but,
as far as the Court was concerned, a ceiling, contrary to how the Court
had previously articulated the relationship between the constitutional
criminal procedure rights and supervisory power.

111. A similar point has been made about the loss of focus on fairness with the Court’s
abandonment of “due process” in favor of enumerated Bill of Rights provisions. See Donald A.
Dripps, Justice Harlan on Criminal Procedure: Two Cheers for the Legal Process School, 3 OHIO ST. J.
CRIM. L. 125, 145–46 (2005); Tracey L. Meares, Everything Old Is New Again: Fundamental Fairness
and the Legitimacy of Criminal Justice, 3 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 105, 111–15 (2005); see also George C.
Thomas III, The Criminal Procedure Road Not Taken: Due Process and the Protection of Innocence, 3
OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 169, 169–70 (2005).
112. See Beale, supra note 10, at 1455–64. For example, some federal courts of appeals required
district judges to inquire into whether a lawyer representing multiple defendants had a conflict of
interest, before a rule of criminal procedure imposed that requirement. See Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446
U.S. 335, 346 n.10 (1980) (noting, “we view such an exercise of the supervisory power as a desirable
practice”). And at least one court of appeals established a presumption that indicted defendants be
tried within six months, otherwise the case would be dismissed. Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 523,
530 n.29 (1972) (noting that the Court’s decision cast no doubt on the appellate court’s rule).
113. Cf. Pushaw, supra note 13, at 746–47 (“[T]he Court has confined ‘federal common law’ to
situations of genuine necessity, such as filling gaps in the Constitution or Acts of Congress.”).
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VI. THE POST-WARREN COURT’S EROSION OF FEDERAL COURTS’
SUPERVISORY POWER
The Burger Court started out where the Warren Court left off,
somewhat indifferent to supervisory power. The Court acknowledged
that federal courts possessed the authority to set standards that were
not constitutionally compelled for federal criminal trials. 114 But the
Court did not go out of its way to use this authority itself. 115
In the 1980s, however, the Court turned hostile, issuing opinions
cutting back on federal courts’ ability to “formulate policy” for federal
criminal trials. In the first, United States v. Payner,116 the federal trial
judge suppressed financial records that investigators obtained for use
against the defendant through a “flagrantly illegal” search of a bank
official.117 The evidence could not be suppressed under the Fourth
Amendment, because the defendant had not himself been searched, and
therefore he lacked standing to raise the constitutional claim.118 But the
114. The Court so recognized in Cupp v. Naughten, which concerned a state court’s jury
instruction that witnesses should be presumed to have testified truthfully. 414 U.S. 141, 149 (1973).
The Court noted that the instruction was universally condemned by federal courts of appeals. Id. at
143, 146. But the Court characterized the federal court decisions as exercises of supervisory
authority, not constitutional interpretation. Id. at 145–46.
A reading of these cases, however, indicates that the courts of appeals were primarily
concerned with directing inferior courts within the same jurisdiction to refrain from giving
the instruction because it was thought confusing, of little positive value to the jury, or
simply undesirable. The appellate courts were, in effect, exercising the so-called
supervisory power of an appellate court to review proceedings of trial courts and to reverse
judgments of such courts which the appellate court concludes were wrong.
Id. at 145–46. Something more would be required, the Court suggested, to find that the jury
instruction violated due process. Id. at 146 (“Before a federal court may overturn a conviction
resulting from a state trial in which this instruction was used, it must be established not merely that
the instruction is undesirable, erroneous, or even ‘universally condemned,’ but that it violated some
right which was guaranteed to the defendant by the Fourteenth Amendment.”). See also Ristaino v.
Ross, 424 U.S. 589, 598 n.10 (1976) (analogizing the case to an earlier decision, overturning a
conviction because of the trial judge’s failure to inquire into the jury venire’s racial prejudice, that
“should be recognized as an exercise of our supervisory power over federal courts”); Donnelly v.
DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637, 648 n.23 (1974) (“We do not, by this decision, in any way condone
prosecutorial misconduct, and we believe that trial courts, by admonition and instruction, and
appellate courts, by proper exercise of their supervisory power, will continue to discourage it.”).
115. In United States v. Hale, the Court invoked supervisory power, not as means of expanding
influence over federal criminal process, but as a way to avoid deciding a constitutional question.
422 U.S. 171, 181 (1975). The Court held that the prosecution could not introduce evidence about,
and draw incriminating inferences from, the defendant’s invocation of the right to remain silent
after being arrested. Id. The court of appeals had held that using this evidence violated the
defendant’s Miranda right. Id. at 173. And in United States v. Caceres, the Court declined to exercise
supervisory authority to suppress evidence obtained in a tax investigation in violation of a federal
tax regulation. 440 U.S. 741, 755–56 & n.22 (1979).
116. 447 U.S. 727 (1980).
117. Id. at 729.
118. Id. at 731–32.
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trial court suppressed the evidence as an exercise of its supervisory
power.119 The Court reversed, holding that “the supervisory power does
not authorize a federal court to suppress otherwise admissible evidence
on the ground that it was seized unlawfully from a third party not before
the court.”120 The Court reasoned that the same societal interest in the
admission of probative evidence that foreclosed the application of the
Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule equally foreclosed this use of
supervisory authority.121 It claimed support for this view from Elkins v.
United States, which, it said, “called for a restrained application of the
supervisory power.”122 The opinion departed from earlier precedent
which, as Justice Marshall observed in his dissent, included several cases
where, although the Fourth Amendment afforded no remedy, the Court
employed supervisory authority to suppress evidence obtained through
government misconduct.123 Elkins was among the most notable of those
prior cases, making the Court’s reliance on Elkins particularly
confounding.
Then in United States v. Hasting,124 decided three years later, the
Court concluded that the harmless error rule limited federal courts’
exercise of supervisory power. In Hasting, the court of appeals
overturned the defendant’s conviction because the prosecutor referred
in his closing argument to the defendant’s failure to present evidence.125
The appellate court evidently concluded that, like a comment on a
defendant’s failure to testify, a comment on the absence of contrary
evidence violated the defendant’s right against self-incrimination.126 The
Court reversed, finding that, even assuming the prosecutor’s argument
was constitutionally impermissible, it was harmless beyond a
reasonable doubt and therefore was not grounds to set aside a criminal

119.
120.
121.
122.
123.

Id. at 731.
Id. at 735.
Id. at 734–35.
Id. at 735 (citing Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 216 (1960)).
Id. at 744 (Marshall, J., with Brennan, and Blackmun, JJ., dissenting).

This Court has on several occasions exercised its supervisory powers over the federal
judicial system in order to suppress evidence that the Government obtained through
misconduct. The rationale for such suppression of evidence is twofold: to deter illegal
conduct by Government officials, and to protect the integrity of the federal courts. The Court
has particularly stressed the need to use supervisory powers to prevent the federal courts
from becoming accomplices to such misconduct.
Id. (citations omitted).
124. 461 U.S. 499 (1983).
125. Id. at 504, 512.
126. Id. at 503.
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conviction.127 Although the appellate court did not expressly justify its
decision based on supervisory authority, Chief Justice Burger’s opinion
for the Court went out of its way to hold that, because the allegedly
improper argument was harmless, the reviewing court likewise could
not employ its supervisory authority to set aside the conviction.128 Along
the way, the Court rationalized this authority narrowly: “The purposes
underlying use of the supervisory powers are threefold: to implement a
remedy for violation of recognized rights; to preserve judicial integrity
by ensuring that a conviction rests on appropriate considerations validly
before the jury; and finally, as a remedy designed to deter illegal
conduct.” 129 This was a far cry from earlier expansive (if under-theorized
or unpersuasive) descriptions of supervisory authority, such as Justice
Frankfurter’s claim in McNabb that this authority expressed federal
courts’ “duty of establishing and maintaining civilized standards of
procedure and evidence.”130
Four Justices declined to join the new Chief Justice’s Hasting
opinion gratuitously eviscerating federal courts’ supervisory authority.
Justice Blackmun would have remanded for a consideration of whether
the perceived constitutional violation was in fact harmless error.131
Justice Stevens would have found that the prosecutor’s comment was
constitutionally permissible and not addressed supervisory power.132
And, joined by Justice Marshall, Justice Brennan took issue with the
Court’s cramped understanding of supervisory power. 133 While
acknowledging that constitutionally impermissible jury arguments are
subject to the harmless error rule, he concluded: “[T]he supervisory
powers of federal appellate courts provide another possible source of
authority, under some carefully confined circumstances, either to forgo
a harmless error inquiry or to reverse a conviction even though the error
at issue is harmless.”134
Payner and Hasting discouraged federal courts’ development of an
expansive sub-constitutional jurisprudence of criminal procedure.135
127. Id. at 507–12.
128. Id. at 505–07.
129. Id. at 505 (citations omitted).
130. McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332, 340 (1943).
131. Hasting, 461 U.S. at 512 (synopsis of Justice Blackmun’s position).
132. Id. at 512–13 (Stevens, J., concurring).
133. Id. at 521–28 (Brennan, J., with Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
134. Id. at 525.
135. See Beale, supra note 10, at 1462 (reading Payner and Hasting to establish that lower courts’
supervisory power is subject to limitations on constitutional remedies). The Court may be more
hospitable to supervisory authority when it leads to rules that disfavor criminal defendants. See
Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985) (upholding rule, issued by court of appeals pursuant to
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Over the past three decades, while reaffirming federal courts’
supervisory authority, the Court has held that authority tightly reined.136
In the lower federal courts, the robust use of supervisory authority
described by Professor Beale seems to have drawn to an end as well,
although there certainly continue to be examples of individual federal
judges and lower federal courts adopting rules and issuing rulings
protective of criminal defendants’ procedural rights based on
supervisory authority.137 And, given the increased conservatism of the
lower court federal judges, one might doubt whether a significantly
more robust set of laws would have developed even if the Supreme Court
had not tapped on the brakes.
VII. CONCLUSION: OFFUTT’S LEGACY
After Mapp, the Warren Court might have continued to invoke its
supervisory authority in federal criminal cases, developing a federal
criminal procedure jurisprudence running parallel to its expanding state
criminal procedure jurisprudence premised on the Bill of Rights
provisions. In federal cases, the Court would not have been limited to
establishing the constitutional floor; nor would it have been compelled
to exercise restraint out of respect for state courts and state processes.
To promote the reliability and integrity of federal proceedings, the Court
could have asserted its own view of fair process not only in adjudication
but in criminal investigations, including with regard to police
interrogations and searches and seizures. To be sure, a robust
supervisory authority jurisprudence would not have bound state courts,
where most criminal cases are brought. But the Warren Court’s

supervisory authority, requiring habeas petitioner to object to magistrate’s report in order to
preserve issues for appeal).
136. See, e.g., Peguero v. United States, 526 U.S. 23, 29–30 (1999) (holding that a district court’s
failure to advise a convicted defendant of the right to appeal is subject to the harmless error rule);
Carlisle v. United States, 517 U.S. 416, 425–28 (1996) (holding district court may not invoke
supervisory authority to enter a judgment of acquittal where the defendant has not filed a timely
motion); United States v. Williams, 504 U.S. 36 (1992) (finding district court may not use
supervisory authority to dismiss indictment where the prosecution failed to introduce substantial
exculpatory evidence to the grand jury); Bank of Nova Scotia v. United States, 487 U.S. 250, 254
(1988) (holding that a federal district court may not use supervisory authority to remedy grand
jury misconduct that is harmless); cf. Dietz v. Bouldin, 136 S. Ct. 1885, 1892 (2016) (addressing
limits on federal district courts’ supervisory authority in civil cases). In some cases, defendants have
benefitted from the Court’s restriction on supervisory authority. See, e.g., Ortega-Rodriguez v.
United States, 507 U.S. 234, 244 (1993) (finding appellate court may not exercise supervisory
authority to dismiss the appeal of a fugitive defendant who has been recaptured).
137. See Jessica A. Roth, The “New” District Court Activism in Criminal Justice Reform, 72 N.Y.U.
ANN. SURV. AM. L. 187, 223–28 (2018) (discussing district courts’ adoption of discovery rules and
rulings that are more demanding than constitutional case law and statutes).
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approach might have influenced state courts in the exercise of their own
supervisory authority. State courts might have been hard-pressed to
explain why, in supervising state criminal proceedings, they should be
less protective or fair than the U.S. Supreme Court and lower federal
courts. Further, the Supreme Court’s supervisory authority decisions
expanding procedural protections in the federal criminal context might
have served as intermediate steps toward more protective
interpretations of the constitutional provisions. We might then identify
Offutt as the Warren Court decision that, building on Justice
Frankfurter’s decision in McNabb, launched a criminal procedure
revolution. But, of course, none of this occurred.
To the extent that Offutt opened the way for the early Warren
Court’s burst of expansive criminal procedure rulings for federal courts,
predicated on its supervisory power, Offutt’s legacy is a modest one. By
focusing on constitutional interpretation in its later years, to the virtual
exclusion of supervisory power, the Warren Court failed to solidify its
earlier gains. It never elaborated a persuasive rationale for the
expansive uses of this authority and failed to demonstrate how
supervisory power could be employed to build on, but go beyond, the
constitutional framework. This made it easier for more conservative
Courts to cut back on the early Warren Court’s supervisory-power
decisions, just as they cut back on the later Warren Court’s constitutional
criminal procedure decisions.
Although it turned out to be Mapp, not Offutt, that launched the
Warren Court’s criminal procedure revolution, Offutt is not entirely
forgotten. It is still occasionally referenced within the narrow confines
of contempt-of-court cases. For example, in Taylor v. Hayes,138 the Court
found Offutt useful in reviewing a state court conviction for
constitutional error.139 In Taylor, a criminal defense lawyer in a murder
case engaged in a running controversy with the state trial judge, who
held the lawyer in criminal contempt after the trial.140 Relying on Offutt,
the Court held that in such circumstances, unless summary contempt
power is exercised at the time of the contumacious conduct,
constitutional due process requires notice and an opportunity to be
heard by a disinterested judge.141
In reviewing criminal contempt convictions, the Court continues to
revert to its supervisory authority. Its most notable contemporary use
138.
139.
140.
141.

Taylor v. Hayes, 418 U.S. 488 (1974).
Id. at 500, 502−03.
Id. at 489−90.
Id. at 502−03.
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of this power was in Young v. United States ex rel. Vuitton Et Fils S.A.,142
holding that, in a contempt-of-court prosecution for violation of a court
order, a trial judge may not appoint the victim’s lawyer to prosecute the
case, but must appoint a disinterested lawyer.143 The Court might have
gone a different route if five Justices were prepared to hold that there is
a due process right to be prosecuted by a disinterested lawyer,144 as
lower courts have done.145 But, citing Offutt and other earlier contempt
cases, the Court expressed enthusiasm for supervisory authority in the
federal criminal contempt context:
The use of this Court’s supervisory authority has played a prominent
role in ensuring that contempt proceedings are conducted in a
manner consistent with basic notions of fairness. The exercise of
supervisory authority is especially appropriate in the determination
of the procedures to be employed by courts to enforce their orders, a
subject that directly concerns the functioning of the Judiciary. We
rely today on that authority to hold that counsel for a party that is the
beneficiary of a court order may not be appointed as prosecutor in a
contempt action alleging a violation of that order.146

Although arising in a narrow class of criminal cases, contempt-of-court
decisions such as Offutt and Young are important expressions of our
ideas and ideals about fair criminal process. The very idea of the
summary criminal contempt process, in which the trial judge serves
essentially as grand jury, prosecutor, victim, witness, trial judge, and
sentencer, challenges ordinary notions of fair process. Where the trial
judge is, or regards himself as, the victim of the defendant’s contempt,
that is a bridge too far, at least, as in Offutt and Taylor, if the contempt
sanction is not issued immediately to preserve order in the courtroom.
Likewise, while a judge may initiate contempt proceedings and assign a
member of the bar to prosecute them, assigning a lawyer who owes a
duty of loyalty to the victim of the contempt, as in Young, denies the
142. 481 U.S. 787 (1987) (plurality).
143. Id. at 804.
144. One justice took this view. See id. at 814–15 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
145. See Bruce A. Green & Rebecca Roiphe, Rethinking Prosecutors’ Conflicts of Interest, 58 B.C. L.
REV. 463, 488–89 & n.116 (2017) (citing authority); Patricia Moran, Private Prosecutors in Criminal
Contempt Actions Under Rule 42(b) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, 54 FORDHAM L. REV.
1141, 1157 n.64 (1986) (citing authority); see also Roger A. Fairfax, Jr., Delegation of the Criminal
Prosecution Function to Private Actors, 43 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 411, 424 n.39, 439 n.99 (2009); Bennett
L. Gershman, Prosecutorial Ethics and Victims’ Rights: The Prosecutor’s Duty of Neutrality, 9 LEWIS &
CLARK L. REV. 559, 562 (2005).
146. Young, 481 U.S. at 808–09 (citing Cheff v. Schnackenberg, 384 U.S. 373, 380 (1966)
(plurality); Yates v. United States, 356 U.S. 363, 366–67 (1958) (per curiam); and Offutt v. United
States, 348 U.S. 11, 17–18 (1954)).
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defendant a prosecution by a lawyer who, in exercising discretion, can
be expected to adhere to the prosecutorial norm of “seeking justice.” It
is meaningful for the reviewing Court to use its supervisory power to
right procedural wrongs in these federal cases.
In retrospect, however, the criminal contempt decisions
recognizing defendants’ procedural rights in the federal criminal context
can just as easily be read as conservative decisions, restricting federal
district courts’ authority. Federal district courts’ contempt power,
although recognized by federal rule, derives from the courts’ inherent
authority to control their processes. Decisions such as Offutt and Young
restrain district courts’ authority, just as Payton and Hasting do. In that
respect, they fit right in with the conservative criminal procedure
jurisprudence of the post-Warren Court.
Offutt also survives as a recognition that judges are human,
emotional and fallible, and that at times various law and judicial
decisions governing the criminal process must take account of the
reality of judges’ human limitations.147 Most of the time, judges are
trusted—perhaps unrealistically—to overcome self-interest and
partisan political preferences, to ignore inadmissible evidence and
irrelevant considerations, and to exercise reason rather than emotion.
But Offutt illustrates that sometimes judges fail to do what the law
presumes they will do, cannot reasonably be expected to do what the
law expects, or will not reasonably appear capable of doing so. The lines
are necessarily imprecise, and the presumption of impartiality is a
strong one. But canons of judicial conduct identify circumstances where
judges must recuse themselves because their impartiality might
reasonably be questioned.148 With occasional cites to Offutt,149 courts
sometimes reassign cases where the assigned judge cannot be trusted to
be impartial, or where public confidence in the judge’s impartiality is

147. See generally Bruce A. Green & Rebecca Roiphe, Judicial Activism in Trial Courts, 74 N.Y.U.
ANN. SURV. AM. L. 365, 374 (2019) (describing the judge in Offutt as one “who takes grievances too
personally and strikes back”).
148. See MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT: CANON 2: RULE 2.11: DISQUALIFICATION (American Bar
Ass’n 2010).
149. See, e.g., United States v. Torkington, 874 F.2d 1441, 1446 (11th Cir. 1989).
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reasonably diminished.150 And, in extreme cases, verdicts are
overturned because of judicial bias.151
And finally, in Justice Frankfurter’s injunction that “justice must
satisfy the appearance of justice,”152 Offutt provides an anthem for the
federal criminal procedure revolution that might have been. This was
the revolution that the Warren Court might have launched in tandem
with its constitutional criminal procedure revolution. This was the
revolution in which federal courts, in common law fashion, developed a
jurisprudence of fair process that was not constricted by constitutional
provisions establishing the minimally tolerable criminal procedures and
that was not constrained by the need to respect individual state
variations. This was the revolution that aimed higher for the federal
courts, modeling how a civilized society treats some of its most
vulnerable citizens.

150. A notable example was Ligon v. City of New York, the Second Circuit’s removal of the district
judge presiding over a challenge to the constitutionality of the New York City police department’s
stop-and-frisk practices. 538 Fed. App’x 101, 102–03 (2d Cir. 2013). See Bruce A. Green, Legal
Discourse and Racial Justice: The Urge to Cry “Bias!”, 28 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 177 (2015); Anil Kalhan,
Stop and Frisk, Judicial Independence, and the Ironies of Improper Appearances, 27 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS
1043 (2014).
151. See, e.g., Williams v. Pennsylvania, 136 S. Ct. 1899 (2016); Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co.,
556 U.S. 868 (2009).
152. Offutt v. United States, 348 U.S. 11, 14 (1954).

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3557323

